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KEEP ON PLEADING: THE CO-EXISTENCE OF
NOTICE PLEADING AND THE NEW SCOPE OF
DISCOVERY STANDARD OF FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(b)(1)
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee cannot, in any practical
way, now attempt to undo the 1938 experiment of notice
pleading coupled with broad discovery because that formula
has become embedded in the infrastructure of American civil
procedure.'
I. INTRODUCION
Courtney Grier, a citizen of Indiana, was shopping at a West Virginia
grocery store during a visit to the state.2 She arrived approximately one-
half hour after the store opened. While in the meat aisle, Ms. Grier
slipped on a pinkish liquid substance and fell to the ground, sustaining
serious injuries to her left knee and back. Ms. Grier noticed that a
butcher was nearby, pushing a meat cart and restocking the meat cases.
She therefore assumed that the pinkish liquid, which resembled meat
juices, had leaked from the cart. The pinkish liquid substance was
actually residue from the wax and materials used by store personnel
while cleaning the floor just before the store opened. This fact was
discovered by store personnel upon inspection of the area where Ms.
Grier fell and identified in a "confidential" report prepared by the store
manager and provided to the insurance company and its attorney.
As a result of her injuries, Ms. Grier had several knee surgeries and
incurred medical expenses and lost wages in an amount in excess of
$75,000. She filed a complaint in Federal District Court against the
grocery store. The complaint, modeled on Form 9 of the Appendix of
Forms included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), alleged
that the defendant was negligent in that the butcher allowed liquid to
leak from the meat cart and onto the floor, leading to Ms. Grier's slip and
1 Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L REv. 517, 520 (1998). Judge Niemeyer is a United States Circuit
Judge in the Fourth Circuit and serves as the Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
Id. at 517.
2 This hypothetical was conceived by the author and contains fictitious names and events.
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fall and resultant injuries.3 In its answer, the defendant denied the
allegations of Ms. Grier's complaint and further raised as an affirmative
defense the absence of notice as to the presence of the liquid on the floor.
During discovery, Ms. Grier requested information in an effort to
determine when the floor was last inspected prior to her fall and next
inspected after her fall. She also requested information concerning the
last and next cleaning of the floor and an identification of the materials
used. The defendant provided the sweep sheets in response to the first
request but objected to the additional requests, indicating that the
information regarding the cleaning of the floor and the materials used
was not within the scope of proper discovery under Rule 26(b)(1). The
defendant argued that the information was not relevant to any claim or
defense because Ms. Grier's complaint alleged that she fell as a result of
leaking meat juices, which had nothing to do with the cleaning and
waxing of the floors, much less the materials used. Ms. Grier filed a
motion to compel production of the requested discovery.4 The recent
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), and its interaction with the rules of
pleading, may impact the court's decision regarding Ms. Grier's request
for discovery.
Since the adoption of the FRCP in 1938, pleadings and discovery
have been intricately interwoven. Together, these two devices perform
significant pretrial functions. The pleadings provide notice to the parties
of each party's claims and defenses.5 The discovery procedures are
designed to ferret out the facts, narrow the issues, and dispose of
baseless claims and defenses.6 The coordinated effort of the pleadings
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 9 (2000). Ms. Grier's complaint, following Form 9, would
state:
1. Allegation of jurisdiction.
2. On December 31, 2000, in Jones' Grocery Store, in Wheeling, West
Virginia, defendant negligently allowed meat juices to leak from a
meat cart onto the floor of the meat aisle.
3. As a result, plaintiff stepped in the meat juices and slipped and
fell sustaining serious injuries to her left knee and back, was
prevented from transacting her business, suffered great pain of
body and mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention and
hospitalization.
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant in the
sum of $100,000 and costs.
4 FRCP Rule 37 allows a party to seek an order compelling a non-responsive or evasive
party to respond to a discovery request. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
5 See infra text accompanying note 31.
6 See iifra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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and discovery has become a basic principle of trial procedure in the
federal courts.7
When the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee)
began its task of drafting the 2000 amendments to the discovery rules, it
began with the assumption that the pleadings and discovery must
continue to work together as they had since the inception of the FRCP.8
The Advisory Committee attempted to amend the scope of discovery
standard to respond to problems with overbroad discovery and
increasing costs, without changing the significant pretrial functions
performed by the pleadings and discovery, as well as the open
disclosure of information.9
7See Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 520.
' See id. Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure usually takes two to three
years and follows a very formal process, comprising of a minimum of seven stages of
comment and review:
1. Initial consideration by the Advisory Commirttee
2 Publication and public comment
3. Consideration of the public comments and final approval
4. Approval by the Standing Committee
5. Approval by the Judicial Conference
6. Approval by the Supreme Court
7. Congressional Review
See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited May 9, 2002)
(providing a summary of the federal rule making process). The process leading to the
amendment to Rule 26 began in the fall of 1996, when the Advisory Committee reexamined
the rules to determine whether the procedure for full disclosure was too expansive to
justify its contribution to the civil process and whether amendments could make the
process more efficient and satisfying. See Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 520-21. The
Committee then held a meeting of experienced lawyers, judges, and academics in January
1997, and a conference at the Boston College of Law in September 1997 to discuss proposed
amendments. Id. at 521. Additionally, the Committee engaged the Federal Judicial Center
to study the expense of discovery, which conducted a survey of 2000 attorneys, receiving
almost 1200 responses. Id. Further, the Committee involved the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice, using its database of information collected in connection with the Civil Justice
Reform Act, which considered how well discovery worked and how it might be improved.
Id. at 522. The Committee also received and reviewed 300 written comments and heard the
testimony of 70 witnesses at three public hearings held in Baltimore, San Francisco, and
Chicago. See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/summary.pdf (ast visited May 9,2002).
9 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm. Meeting Minutes (November 12-13, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ civil/Minutes/1198civiminutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002);
Civil Rules Advisory Comm. Meeting Minutes (March 16-17, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0398civilminutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002);
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure Meeting Minutes (June 18-19,1998), available at
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0698standingminutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002).
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On December 1, 2000, several amendments to FRCP 26 and the other
discovery rules became effective.10  Although these changes raise
numerous issues, this Note is devoted specifically to the amended scope
of Rule 26(b)(1)'s discovery standard and how it will, or will not, affect
notice pleading. Part II presents the history and development of
pleading and discovery from the common law to the FRCP." Part 1H also
discusses the current amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) and the difference
from the previous version of that rule.12 Part I explores the alleged
ramifications of the new Rule 26(b)(1) to notice pleading13 Part IV
examines how Mississippi, a notice pleading jurisdiction operating
under a similar scope of discovery standard, has succeeded in the co-
existence of notice pleading and its similar scope standard. 4 Part V
provides guidelines, based upon judicial reasoning gathered and
synthesized from cases in Mississippi, 5 to be followed in interpreting the
new federal scope of discovery standard in discovery matters.16 The
discovery dispute in Ms. Grier's case is analyzed and the discovery
allowed is determined by application of the guidelines created for the
new standard.1 7 Part VI concludes that the new Rule 26(b)(1) scope of
'
0 See FED. EL Civ. P. 26,30, and 37.
11 See infra Part II.
12 Id.
13 See infra Part Ill.
14 See infra Part IV.
Is See infra Part W.B. Mississippi's rule with respect to pleadings provides:
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and,...
Miss. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added). Mississippi's rule with respect to the permissible
scope of discovery provides:
(b) Scope of Discomery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of
any party. The discovery may include the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things; and the identity and location of persons (i)
having knowledge of any discoverable matter or (ii) who may be
called as witnesses at the trial. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
MisS. R CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
16 See infra Part V.A.
17 See infra Part V.B.
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discovery standard will not negate notice pleading and that the two can
co-exist in the federal procedural system.'5
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PLEADING AND DISCOVERY
Prior to 1938, in the federal courts there existed minimal uniform
rules dedicated to practice and procedure. Instead, each court operated
according to the rules of procedure for the state in which it was located. 19
Passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 finally allowed substantial
changes to occur.20 The act authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe
general rules of pleading and practice in civil actions and to unite the
rules for equity and law into a single form of procedure.2' Two basic
I See infra Part VI.
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 61, at 423-24 (5th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS]. Prior to 1872 temporary process acts
mandated that the federal courts follow the state's practice and procedure as it existed on
September 29, 1789. Id. (citing Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93). This
resulted in "static conformity" because as a state changed its procedural laws, the federal
court sitting in that state could not follow, but instead had to continue to follow the state's
discarded laws. Id. The Conformity Act of 1872 changed this by providing that the federal
courts were to conform to the existing "practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding in civil causes" of the state courts of the state in which the federal court sat. Id.
at 425 (citing Act of June 1, 1872. ch. 255, 17 Stat. 197; Rev. Stat. § 914). This resulted in a
"continuing or dynamic conformity," the essence of which was to require lawyers to only
have to know one set of rules for state and federal court practice. Id. Given the adoption of
several exceptions to conformity, this was better in theory than in practice. Id. at 425-26.
During this time, law and equity were still separate; however, the situation in the equity
courts was preferable because the Supreme Court had adopted rules relative to procedure
in the equity courts. Id. at 426. It was evident that change was necessary because of the
"erratic conformity to state procedure, [the] anachronistic survival of the separation
between law and equity, and [the] failure to take advantage of the possibilities of judicial
rulemaking." Id. § 62, at 426. See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON
CODE PLEADING 31-34 (2d ed. 1947) (relating the historical background to federal pleading)
[hereinafter CLARK, CODE PLEADING]; Charles E. Clark & James Wn. Moore, A New Federal
Civil Procedure: 1. The Background, 44 YALE L REv. 387, 394-409 (1935) (discussing the history
and development of law and equity procedures and the Conformity Act); Jay S. Goodman,
On the Fiflieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?
21 SUFFOLK U. L REv. 351, 351-54 (1987).
2 See Act of June 19,1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 723 (1934)) (sections
consolidated in 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
2 See WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 62, at 426-27; see also id. § 67, at
465-66; Goodman, supra note 19, at 355. The Supreme Court did not take any action for
almost one year after passage of the Act. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19,
§ 62, at 428. Then, Chief Justice Hughes, at the behest of a letter from Attorney General
William D. Mitchell, stirred by an article calling for reform through merger of law and
equity written by Charles E. Clark and James William Moore, announced to the American
Law Institute that the new rules would unify the procedure for actions at law and cases in
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principles for procedural reform were advocated by Charles E. Clark, the
reporter of the fourteen-member Advisory Committee assigned with
drafting the FRCP.22 First, Clark advocated that all cases should be
decided on their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings.3
Second, he advocated that a basic goal in litigation should be economy of
time and resources. 24 Evidence that the Advisory Committee adopted
these principles when drafting the Rules is provided by the requirement
that the Rules be construed to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action"25 together with a simplified form of
pleadinge6 and liberalized discovery. 27 The FRCP provided the needed
reform in federal court practice, particularly through two key features:
the adoption of notice pleading and the vitalization of discovery.2 8 The
following sections of this Part discuss the history and development of
these two features.29
A. Pleadings: The Rise of Notice Pleading
Historically, pleadings served four functions.30 First, they gave
notice of the nature of a claim or defense.31 Second, they stated the facts,
equity. id.; Goodman, supra note 19, at 355-56. Finally, an Advisory Committee was
appointed and, after the circulation of three drafts for comment and criticism, a final draft
of the rules was submitted to the Supreme Court in November 1937, and the Court adopted
the proposed rules on December 20,1937. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19,
§ 6Z at 428. The rules were submitted to Congress and, given no adverse legislation,
became effective on September 16,1938. Id.; see also CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 19,
at 34-38 (relating the process of enactment of the original Federal Rules); James A. Pike &
John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: 1, 38 COLUM. L REV. 1179,
1180-86 (1938).
2 Goodman, supra note 19, at 356-57 (citing Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23
WASH. U. LQ. 297, 297-320 (1938)) (discussing new rules and necessity of regularized
procedure). Charles Clark has been called the operational force on the Advisory
Committee. Id. He taught for twenty years and served as Dean for ten years at Yale Law
School and was later appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, where he served for twenty-four years. Rewiting the Rudes, AM. LAW., Dec. 1999, at
51. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been described as "Clark's lasting
monument!" Id.
23 Goodman, supm note 19, at 357.
24Id.
25 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
26 See FED. R CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
28 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Et AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.7, at 258 (3d ed. 1999); see also id.
§ 7.1, at 386; WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 81, at 577-78 (referring to
discovery as the "Cinderella of the changes in procedure made by the Civil Rules").
- See infra Parts I.A.-B.
30 WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 468. Pleading under the
common law placed special emphasis upon the issue formulating function of pleadings,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 [2002], Art. 5
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as believed to exist, on which the claim was brought.32 Third, they
narrowed the issues.33 Fourth, they provided a means for speedy
disposition of non-meritorious claims and defenses.34 Given these
functions, at common law the pleadings were a very important, if not the
most important, element in a lawsuit and could continue indefinitely
until a single issue of law or fact was produced for trial.35 Strict rules
developed because of the importance of the pleadings.36 As a result,
defects in the pleadings led to an early disposition of the lawsuit, not
based upon the merits of the claims, but instead based on their failure to
perform the required functions.37
In response to the injustice of common law pleading practice and the
movement for reform, New York adopted the Field Code (the code) in
1948, that was later imitated by many other states.38 Under the code, the
pleadings were limited to three types: a complaint, an answer, and a
and thus is referred to as "issue pleading." CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 19, at 3, 56.
Pleading under the code placed special emphasis upon the fact stating function of
pleadings and thus is referred to as "fact pleading." Id. at 3-4, 56. Modem pleading places
special emphasis upon the notice giving function of pleadings and thus is referred to as




3 Id. § 66, at 456; see also id. § 68, at 468. In a slow, expensive, and unworkable, scientific
fashion, the pleadings continued by rigid stages of denial, avoidance and demurrer until a
single issue of law or fact, dispositive of the case, emerged. id. § 68, at 468; see also CLARK,
CODE PLEADING, supra note 19, at 12-15 (relating the history and process of common law
pleading); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed The Historical Background of the
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L REV. 691, 695 (1998) [hereinafter Subrin, Fishing
Expeditions] (stating that the assumption of such a critical role by the pleadings meant that
there was not much need for discovery); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Cwil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L REV. 909,914-21
(1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Historical Perspective] (relating the process of common law and
equity procedure). For an example of the process, see R. Ros PERRY, COMMON LAW
PLEADING: ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES 227-28 (1897).
3 See WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 468. If an essential allegation
were left out of the pleadings, the claim would likely have been disposed of by way of a
demurrer or a motion to dismiss. 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202, at 69 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter WRIGHT, PRACTcE AND PROCEDURE]. See
generally PERRY, supra note 35, at 231-433 (discussing Stephen's Rules of Pleading).
37 See WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 468.
3' See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 19, at 21-23. The New York Code of 1848 is
generally referred to as the "Field Code" because it was largely the work of David Dudley
Field. Id. at 22. The Field Code has served as the model of all succeeding codes in the
United States. Id.
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reply.39 The most important characteristics of the code were its marriage
of law and equity into one form of action and its system of pleading the
facts.40 This system called for a simple and concise statement of the facts,
commonly referred to as "fact pleading."41 The difficulty in this system
of pleading arose from the distinction between facts and conclusions,
because a pleader was only to plead the facts.42 As such, reform
continued since the fact pleading system under the code, like common
law pleading practice, had its own inherent problems. 3
The adoption of the FRCP in 1938 established a uniform system of
pleading in the federal courts.44 The FRCP specifically impacted the
pleading process by both limiting the number and type of pleadings
while simplifying the form of those pleadings. 45 One of the keystones of
this system of procedure is included in Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that
3 WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTS, supra note 19, § 66, at 456. The two most important
features of the code were the abolition of the common law forms of action and the union of
law and equity. Id. § 67, at 465. These two features were recognized as essential by Chief
Justice Taft, and later by Chief Justice Hughes in his charge to the committee responsible
for drafting the federal rules with these tasks. Id. at 465-66; see id. § 62 at 428 & n.l (citing
Address of Chief Justice Hughes, 21 A.B.A. J. 340,12 A.LI. PROCEEDINGs 54 (1935)); see also
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 US. 235, 243 (1922) (stating in an opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Taft that Congress was looking toward the union of law and equity when it
allowed transfer of cases between the law side and the equity side). See generally Subrin,
Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 696-97 (explaining the role of discovery under the Field
Code and indicating Field's belief that precise and verified pleadings should be used to
eliminate legal and factual issues and to focus the controversy).
40 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 19, at 22-23, 56.
41Id. at 23.
4 The pleader would plead the facts, while at the same time attempting to avoid the pitfalls
of stating conclusions and pleading evidence. 5 WRIGHT, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 36, § 1202, at 71.
4 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 19, at 23 (stating that fact pleading was least
successful because of a failure to recognize the difference between statements of fact and
statements of law, which is almost entirely one of degree). See generally id. at 225-45
(discussing code pleading and the distinction between fact, law, and evidence while
comparing the goals of pleading under the Federal Rules); 5 WRIGHT, PRACrICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 36, § 1202, at 71-72 (discussing code pleading and its failure to
perceive the distinctions between facts and conclusions as one of degree only).
4See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 28, § 5.1, at 245. Although a majority of the states had
followed New York's lead by the late 1930s, many states still followed common law
pleading practice. Id. As a result of the Conformity Act, the federal courts were required
to apply the rules of practice of the states in which they sat. Id.; see also supra note 19
(explaining the Conformity Act). Although the Equity Rules of 1912 had developed a
simplified system of pleading practice for suits in equity, cases at law did not enjoy that
same simplification until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 28, § 5.1, at 245.
4 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 7-12 (providing the rules relative to complaints, answers,
counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party complaints, and replies).
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pleadings need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."46 Rule 8(a)(2) has not
undergone any substantive changes since its enactment.47
However, the new federal system of pleading practice, commonly
referred to as "notice pleading,"d was not embraced without resistance,
and criticisms and suggestions for amendment to Rule 8 soon arose.49 In
1955, the Advisory Committee responded by expressing that Rule 8 was
succeeding in its original intent by allowing a statement of the claim in
general terms, discouraging battles over the form of pleading, and
discarding needless controversies that persisted under the codes.50
4 FED. R Cirv. P. 8(a)(2); WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 467; see
also Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require detailed facts, but only a short and plain statement of the claim to
give fair notice and state the grounds upon which the claim rests). Rule 8 was derived
from a number of sources and preexisting practices: the federal Equity Rules, particularly
Rules 25 and 30; various state codes, especially those of New York and Connecticut; and
the English practice under the Judicature Act. 5 WRIGHT, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 36, § 1201, at 65-66.
47 See generally 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 8App.01 (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE].
48 At least one commentator believes that this label is unfortunate because it leads to
confusion and unnecessary criticism of the rules. 5 WRIGHT, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 36, § 1202, at 72-73. He suggests that "modem pleading" or "simplified
pleading" would be a more appropriate label Id.; see also Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293
F.2d 546, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating that federal pleading is still issue pleading and that
the use of the term notice pleading is prejudicial to a proper operation of the federal
system). Regarding the Supreme Court's reference to the system as one of "notice
pleading" in Conley v. Gibson, Wright suggests that it was a statement of aim and not of
definition because the Court emphasized that the federal rules require the complaint to
give a defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests." 5 WRIGHT, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 36, § 1202, at 73 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 58 (1957)). Thus, the pleader cannot simply make a bare averment that
he wants relief and is entitled to it. Id. However, great generality is allowed as long as fair
notice is given. Id.
49 See Nancy J. Bladich, The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil Rights Cases, 65 CORNELL
L REV. 390, 416-17 (1980). Practitioners and judges were shocked that Rule 8 had
abandoned the pleading's focus upon facts. Id. at 416. They believed that a more detailed
complaint than the notice pleading called for by Rule 8 was necessary in order to
accomplish precise issue-identificationr Id. After a controversial opinion in Dioguardi v.
Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), wherein the court upheld an inarticulately drawn
complaint as meeting the requirements of notice pleading, the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference recommended that Rule 8 be amended, adding the language that the statement
of the claim should also contain "the facts constituting a cause of action" Id. at 416-17
(citing Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1951)).
5 See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 8App.01 [03]. There had been criticism
about the functioning of Rule 8(a)(2), and the Advisory Committee, in refusing to amend
the rule in 1955, stated that it is clearly indicated by the forms appended to the rules and
Rule 8's interaction with other rules that Rule 8(a) intuitively requires the statement of
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Accordingly, the Advisory Committee rejected suggestions for
amendment s'
In 1957, when the Supreme Court decided Conley v. Gibson,52 it
affirmed and extended its commitment to notice pleading.3 The Court
rejected an argument that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed,
relying on the notion that Rule 8 did not require the plaintiff to set out in
detail the facts upon which his claim was based, but rather required the
plaintiff to give fair notice to the defendant by way of a "short and plain
statement of the claim."54 With this decision, challenges to notice
pleading subsided.55
Notice had become the sole function of the pleadings given the
simplified pleading requirements of the FRCP.56 No longer were the
pleadings required to state the facts, narrow the issues, or provide a
means for the speedy disposition of non-meritorious claims and
defenses.57 Under the current system of pleading practice, techniques
more efficient than the pleadings are provided for performing these
three of the four common law functions.58 The FRCP removed the
exclusive responsibility for these functions from the province of the
circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented. Id. A pleader
cannot simply make a bare averment but must disclose adequate information as a basis of
the claim or defense. Id.
51 Id.
- 355 US. 41 (1957).
53 Bladich, supra note 49, at 417.
-% Confry, 355 US. at 47. The Court embraced the intent of Rule 8 by stating that "[tihe
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to fadlitate a proper decision on the merits." Id. at 48.
5s Blaidich, supra note 49, at 417.
m WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 468. Pleading practice under the
federal rules has been referred to as 'notice pleading." FREDEniTHAL, supra note 28, § 5.7,
at 258-59. This term is considered objectionable by many commentators because it
connotes that no more is required of a pleading than a mere statement that a suit has been
filed and damages are desired. Id. at 259. These commentators have suggested instead the
use of "modem pleading" or "simplified pleading" because more is required of a pleading
than mere notice, including a reference to the circumstances and events upon which the
claim or defense is based. Id. What the rules actually require is that the opposing party
and the court obtain a basic understanding of the claim being made. Id. (citing Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 US. 163, 166 (1993);
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 US. 738, 746 (1976); Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41,47-48 (1957)); see also supra note 48.
7 See supra text acompanying notes 30-34.
sSee FED. R. Civ. P. 16,26-37, 56; see also Con/ey, 355 US. at 47-48; Hickman v. Taylor, 329
US. 495,500 (1947); WRIGHT, LAWOF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 468.
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pleadings and allowed for facts to be determined and issues to be
narrowed by discovery, an area that was also significantly impacted and
changed by the enactment of the FRCP.5 9
B. Discovery: The Rise of an Important Pre-Trial Mechanism
1. From the Common Law to December 1, 2000
At common law, discovery was virtually non-existent.60 Trial by
surprise was the norm because at the time of trial many litigants did not
know what their adversary's position or evidence would be.61 The
adoption of the discovery provisions of the FRCP revolutionized the
practice of law in the United States.62 The FRCP made discovery a vital
part of the litigation process.63 In fact, nine years after adoption of the
FRCP, the Supreme Court decided in Hickman v. Taylor" that one of the
most significant innovations of the rules were the mechanisms for pre-
trial deposition-discovery.6s The Hickman Court explained that the new
rules invested the pre-trial functions of issue-formulation and fact-
revelation, once performed by the pleadings, to the deposition-discovery
process and left only the function of notice-giving to the pleadings."
Making clear the function of discovery, the Hickman Court declared that
the rules would allow the parties to obtain the fullest possible
59 WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 19, § 68, at 468. The rules also provided for
issue narrowing by pretrial conference or partial summary judgment and disposal of cases
with no real controversy by summary judgment. Id.
60 See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 28, § 7.1, at 386. At common law, discovery was limited and
depositions could be taken only under court order and only for the preservation of
testimony as provided by statute. Goodman, supra note 19, at 360. The federal statutes
allowing depositions were aimed at preserving the testimony of a witness who would be
unavailable for trial, or obtaining critical evidence for trial, or completing a pleading that
was otherwise unobtainable. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 699. Any
discovery that resulted from the depositions was only accidental and incidental 8 WRIGHT,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 36, § 200Z at 52. The common law statutes allowing
discovery were not aimed at goals similar to that of present-day, pretrial discovery. See
Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 698-701 (describing discovery in the federal
courts prior to the federal rules); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 636, 639-48 (1934); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 47, 26App.100 (describing the discovery procedures at common
law).
61 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 28, § 7.1, at 386. At common law, a trial was probably more
similar to the typical episode of Perry Mason or Matlock, where a vital piece of evidence is
entered in the final moments before the trial concludes.
62 1d. (citing Developments in the Law -Discovery, 74 HARV. L REV. 940,950 (1961)).
63Id.
-329 US. 495 (1947).
6 5d. at 500.
661d. at S01.
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knowledge of the issues and facts before trial so that trial by surprise
would no longer occur.67 Because mutual knowledge of all relevant facts
was essential to proper litigation, the Court also declared that the rules
were to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. 68
The drafter of the federal discovery rules, Edson Sunderland,
advocated several benefits of expanded discovery. 69 First, discovery
would eliminate surprise.70 Second, it would allow for the preservation
of testimony in the case of the death or unavailability of a witness."
Third, discovery would diminish the importance of pleadings.7 Fourth,
it would permit more effective use of summary judgment procedures.73
Fifth, discovery would help focus the trial on the main points in
controversy.74 Sixth, it would permit each side to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of its case, promoting informed settlement and making
some trials unnecessary. 5 While most of Sunderland's ideas were
engrafted into the rules, the Advisory Committee did not adopt the
broad scope of discovery that Sunderland sought.76 Provisions for wide-
open discovery were either deleted from initial drafts or did not make it
into a draft.7 However, most of the provisions Sunderland sought
permitting liberalized discovery were incorporated in the FRCP by later
amendments.7 8
As originally adopted, Rule 26(b)(1) only applied to depositions and
allowed examination regarding "any matter, not privileged, which [was]
67Id.
68 Id. at 507; see also United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 US. 677, 682 (1958)
("Modem instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose .... They together with pretrial
procedures make a trial less a game of blind man's buff and more a fair contest with the
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.").
See Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 716. Sunderland was a well-established
scholar at Michigan Law School, whose "disdain for formalistic limitations and desire for a
more common sense all-encompassing procedure" had been revealed in his articles about
discovery. Id. at 715. Most of Sunderland's ideas were engrafted into drafts of the rules






73 Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 716.
76Id. at 720.
7 Id. For an explanation of the drafting process of the original Federal Rules, including the
Advisory Committee's concerns about discovery, see id. at 717-29.
7Id. at 720. The momentum begun by Sunderland for more liberalized discovery gained
additional momentum during the decade after passage of the Rules and, in 1946,
amendments resulted in even greater liberalization. Id. at 720 n.165.
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relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action whether
relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or the claim or
defense of any other party."79 The purpose of the chosen phraseology
for the relevance standard was to minimize discovery arguments.80
A little under a decade later, the discovery rules were amended and
the broad scope of discovery allowed by the rule was made clear in the
new Rule 26(b)(1). This amendment instilled in Rule 26(b)(1) an
overarching scope of discovery standard by adding into all other
discovery rules a reference back to the scope standard of Rule 26(b)(1).81
Equally important was the addition of language indicating that the
information sought did not have to be admissible at trial as long as it was
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.82
Thus, the 1946 amendments to Rule 26 began to make broad and far-
reaching discovery possible under the FRCP.83
The first major revision to Rule 26(b)(1), and the discovery rules in
general, came in 1970 when Rule 26's title was changed, and the
substance of Rule 26 was revised to cover discovery in general instead of
solely depositions.84 The new rule allowed the parties to obtain
76 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47,1 26App.01[1] (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1)
(1938) (amended 1970)); see also MATTHEW BENDER, MOORE'S FEDERAL RULEs PAMPHLET
2001, PART 1: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26.2 (2000) [hereinafter MOORE'S
FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET]. The original rule was entitled "Depositions Pending Action."
6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 26App.Ol1]. See generally Pike & Willis,
supra note 21, at 1186-88.
a0 Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 723. Sunderland attempted to broaden the
scope of discovery in his initial draft by allowing discovery of "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the pending cause as shown in the pleadings on file therein." Id. at 722
n.174 (citing Rule 49, Tentative Draft No. 1, Oct 18, 1933, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE: COMMrrmIEs ON RuLES OF PRACriCE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1938, at C804-
16).
81 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 11 26App.02[1]-[2 (citing FED. R. CirV. P.
26(b)(1) (1946) (amended 1970)); Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 736.
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47,
26App.02[1]-[2]. Another amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), which also occurred in 1946, was
the change of the word "relating" to "it relates" in the scope standard. FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(1) (2000). After 1946, there were two more amendments to Rule 26, but neither
affected Rule 26(b)(1). 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 11 26App.03[1],
26App.04[1]; see also Subrin, Fishing Expeditions, supra note 35, at 736 (indicating that the
1946 amendments "went a long way toward completing the discovery revolution").83 Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 216-17 (3d Cir. 1945); see also Subrin, Fishing Expeditions,
supra note 35, at 738 ("By the end of the first decade after the Federal Rules became law,
many courts were routinely giving the discovery provisions the full scope the drafters had
intended.").
84 See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 26App.05[1] (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26
(1970) (amended 1983)). The title was amended to "General Provisions Governing
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discovery of any non-privileged matter that was "relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relate[d] to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party."S The Advisory Committee intended to allow Rule 26 to
regulate discovery that was obtainable through any of the discovery
techniques." With the 1970 amendment, the extensive nature of
discovery became evident not only in depositions but in all forms of
discovery.97
As a result of allowing extensive discovery, problems began to occur
in the form of over-discovery and redundant or disproportionate
discovery.8 In response, the next major revision to Rule 26(b)(1)
occurred in 1983.89 The amendment gave courts the authority to reduce
the amount of discovery allowed.9° As a result of the 1983 amendments,
many scholars and practitioners believed that pleading practice in the
federal courts would be returned to pre-1938 fact pleading." However,
Discovery" and section (b) was changed to "Scope of Discovery." lId The other discovery
rules underwent a limited rearrangement in order to establish Rule 26 as the rule that
governed discovery in general. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE, supra note 47,
26App.05[2]; 8 WRIGHT, PRACtCE & PROCEDURE, supra note 36, § 2003, at 53-54.
55 See 6 MOoRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 26App.05[1] (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)
(1970) (amended 1983)). Rule 26(b)(1) specifically provided: "Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party." Id. (emphasis added).
*FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
97 See generally United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F2d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1976)
(recognizing that the federal rules authorize extremely broad discovery); Natl Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 73 F.R.D. 467 (D. Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62 69 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The scope of discovery standard virtually
remained unchanged until the most recent amendment. See infra notes 88-95 and
accompanying text.
ISee 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 26App.07[1]-[2].
id.
90 Id. The amendment contemplated greater judicial involvement and was intended to
encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note; 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
47, 26App.07[2]. The next amendment occurred in 1987, thus eliminating all gender-
specific language in Rule 26. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note; 1 MOORE'S
FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET, supra note 79, 26.2, at 278.
1Goodman, supra note 19, at 352. The most significant amendment, which resulted in the
fear of a return to pre-1938 fact pleading, was that made to Rule 11. Id. at 352, 365. It was
argued that the amendment sought to curb discovery abuses by requiring a reasonable
inquiry into the facts prior to filing. Id. at 365. Goodman argued that, although the
amendments would not require attorneys to resort to fact pleading, attorneys would have
to "be prepared to present the level of documentation on the merits that used to be called
fact pleading." Id. at 367. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil
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fact pleading did not return, and discovery proceeded as it had been
since adoption of the rules, although with the broader scope made
possible by the 1946 amendments.92
One of the most controversial amendments was made to the
discovery rules in 1993.93 The amendment provided for automatic
disclosure of certain materials that, prior to the amendment, had to be
specifically requested through discovery.'4 This amendment did not
specifically address the scope of discovery standard, which actually
remained unchanged until the 2000 amendment 95
Unlike the 1993 amendments, the new amendments effective on
December 1, 2000, go to the very heart of the scope of discovery
standard.96 The previous rule provided for discovery of "any matter, not
privileged, which [was] relevant to the subject matter." 97 The new rule
provides for discovery of "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to
the claim or defense of any party."98 Rule 26(b)(1) now allows automatic
discovery of non-privileged information that is relevant to any party's
claims or defenses, instead of discovery that is relevant to the subject
matter.99 The rule continues to allow discovery of information relevant
Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648 (1981) (discussing how the proposals to amend the rules would
rid the system of its simplicity).
92See generally Leksi, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 103-04 (D. N.J. 1989) (finding that
broad scope of discovery allowed discovery of drafting history of insurance policies,
insurers participation in organizations, and insurers adoption of standard form policy
language in a declaratory judgment action concerning insurance coverage); Cutler v.
Lewiston Daily Sun, 105 F.R.D. 137, 140 (D. Me. 1985) (recognizing the broad scope of
discovery and requiring the defendant to respond to discovery requests); M. Berenson Co.
v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 635, 637 (D. Mass. 1984) (stating that the broad
mandates of discovery demand that the scope of discovery be liberally construed in order
to provide both attorneys with information essential to proper litigation on all facts);
Weddington v. ConsoL Rail Corp., 101 F.R.D. 71, 73, 76 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (stating that the
rules are interpreted liberally to allow maximum discovery and to require discovery).
93See FED. R. Cry. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
9 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(1) (1999) (amended 2000); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra
note 47, 26App.09[11]-[2]. In 1993, Rule 26 was substantially rewritten and
fundamentally changed the discovery process through its provisions for mandatory
disclosures. See 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET, supra note 79, 26.2, at 278-79. The
saving grace for many jurisdictions was the opt-out provision included within the Rule.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (1999) (amended 2000). So many jurisdictions exercised this
option that uniform discovery practice was virtually eliminated in the federal courts.
FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 28, § 7.18, at 440.
95 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
- See infra Part II.B.2.
97 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1999) (amended 2000).
"FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
99 Id. Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
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(b) Discovery Scope and Limits...
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or deftnse of any party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of
any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
Id. (emphasis added). In 1977, language similar to the new Rule's language was proposed
by the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation of the Special Committee on Abuse
of Discovery following its review of the federal discovery rules: "Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the
claims or defenses of any party." Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of
Discovery Abuse, Report to the Bench and Bar, 92 F.R.D. 137, app. at 157 (1980) (emphasis
added); see also Weyman I. Lundquist & H. Stephen Schechter, The New Relevancy: An End
to Trial by Ordeal, 64 A.B.A. J. 59,59-60 (1978) (discussing the ABA's proposed amendment
to Rule 26(b)(1)'s scope of discovery standard); Richard L Marcus, Discovery Containment
Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753-57 & n.38 (1998) (discussing the Advisory Committee's
flirtation with changing the scope of discovery standard in the 1980 amendments). See
generally DANIEL SEGAL, SURVEY OF LrERATURE ON DisCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT:
EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS 17 (1978); Elizabeth G. Thomburg,
Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229,
237-38 (1999) (detailing the ABA's attempts to effect changes in the scope of discovery
standard as a precursor to the 1998 proposals and 2000 amendments). The purpose of the
ABA's proposed language was to "direct courts not to continue the present practice of
erring on the side of expansive discovery," which the ABA believed might have been the
result of the reference to "subject matter" in the rule. Second Report of the Special
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, Report to the Bench and Bar, 92 F.R.D. 137,
app. at 158. The Advisory Committee, which met in 1978 to discuss amendments to the
federal discovery rules, considered the ABA's recommendation on narrowing the scope of
discovery, but instead proposed for public comment the following language: "Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action whether it relates to claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or
the claim or defense of any other party." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 623-24 & n.54 (1978) (emphasis added); see
also Marcus, supra, at 756. The Advisory Committee rejected the ABA's proposed language
because it doubted that the replacement of a general term, "subject matter," with another
general term, "issues," would prevent abuse, and that the introduction of a new term in the
place of a familiar term would invite unnecessary litigation. SEGAL, supra, at 19-20; Marcus,
supra, at 757. In 1979, after receiving public comments to the proposed amendment, the
Advisory Committee withdrew the recommended change, explaining that it believed "that
abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, [was] not so general as to require
such basic changes." Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323, 332 (1979); see also Marcus, supra, at 759. The ABA
maintained its position that the scope of discovery standard should be narrowed. Marcus,
supra, at 760 & n.69. The proposal did not die and was resurrected in 1989 by a section of
the New York Bar Association but was again rejected by the Advisory Committee.
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to the subject matter if good cause is shown10 This amendment is the
Advisory Committee's response to concerns about the costs and delay of
discovery's' The broad scope of discovery is not entirely removed from
the Rule; rather, discovery is divided into two levels: attorney-managed
discovery and court-managed discovery.102 Given what appears to be a
mere division of responsibilities, it is questionable as to what the
difference is between the old and the new standard. 103
2. The "Old" Versus the "New" Scope of Discovery Standard: Just What
Is the Difference?'04
Since the adoption of the discovery rules, the purpose of discovery
has been the definition and clarification of issues and ascertainment of
the facts.1 5 Under the pre-2000 Rule 26(b)(1) standard, the scope of
Thomburg, supra, at 238. The Committee's rejection stemmed from opinions that the
change would make no real difference and would require a return to fact pleading. Id.
' FED. P CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
101 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee also addressed
the fact that this amendment was originally proposed in 1978 by the American Bar
Association and had been proposed by other bar groups since then. Id. Although similar
to the 1978 proposal, the Committee explained that the 2000 amendment differs
significantly in that while the scope of discovery is defined as matter relevant to the claims
or defenses of any party, this only describes party-controlled discovery. Id. The new
amendment leaves intact discovery of matter relevant to the subject matter but gives
control of allowing such discovery on a showing of good cause to the court so that the
court manages cases involving sweeping or contentious discovery. Id. The Committee also
placed reliance for the amendment and its purposes upon a 1997 survey of lawyers that
revealed that about one-third of the lawyers surveyed endorsed a narrowing of the scope
of discovery. Id. (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE,
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN
CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 44-45 (1997)).
102 John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 539
(2000); Kathleen L Blaner et al., Federal Discovery: Crown Jewel or Curse?, 24 LrIG. Summer
1998, at 8, 10 (explaining that attorney-managed discovery is limited to information
relevant to the claims or defenses and court-managed discovery involves information
relevant to the subject matter which the court orders for good cause shown); Gregory P.
Joseph, P.L.I. LrnG., The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules: A Preliminary Analysis,
628 LING. 379,388 (2000).
103 See Beckerman, supra note 102, at 510-11 (advocating that the change in language is
merely a semantic change unlikely to have much effect, except to generate more discovery
disputes and greater need for judicial involvement).
104 For a hypothetical case example describing how the old and the new standards differ,
see infra part V.B.
im See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text, see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 US. 495,
501 (1947); St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Fin. Group, 198 F.R.D. 508, 511
(N.D. Iowa 2000) (citing Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 145 F.R.D. 507,509 (S.D. Iowa 1992))
(stating that the discovery rules mandate a liberality in the scope of discovery in order to
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discovery was very broad and liberally construed.106 Information that
was relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action was
generally discoverable. 107 As such, the reach of discovery extended to
any matter that had a bearing upon, or to any matter that reasonably
could lead to other matter that had a bearing upon, any issue in the
case.108
Given the broad definitional reach, a general rule of relevancy has
never been developed.109 Discovery has neither been limited to the
issues raised by the pleadings nor to the merits of the case.110 On the
other hand, the scope of discovery standard has never been interpreted
carry out discovery's purposes of providing the parties with essential facts, eliminating
surprise and promoting settlement).
'( Hickan, 329 U.S. at 507 ("The way is now clear .. for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."). The Supreme Court affirmed the
broad reach of discovery when it indicated that the "fishing expedition" objection could
not be used to preclude a party from obtaining discovery. Id.; see also Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,350 (1978); Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297 (1969); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964). To
understand the reason for the broad scope of discovery, it is helpful to understand that the
right to obtain information through discovery does not necessarily mean that there is a
right under the Federal Rules of Evidence to use the information at trial. 8 WRIGHT,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 36, § 2007, at 95. In fact, the question of relevance in
the discovery stage is more liberally construed than it is in the trial stage. Id. § 2008, at 99-
100; see Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046,1049 (9th Cir. 1981); Kerr v. United States Dist Court,
511 F.2d 192,196 (9th Cir. 1975); Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970);
Bowman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 110 F.R.D. 525,527 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
10 7 Prior to the recent amendment, FRCP 26(b)(1) provided:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to
the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of discoverable matter. The information
sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (1999) (amended 2000) (emphasis added); see Gagne v. Reddy, 104
F.R.D. 454, 456 (D. Mass. 1984); Cox v. McClellan, 174 F.R.D. 32, 34 (W.D.N.Y. 1997);
Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
10' See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 US. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 US. 495, 501 (1947)); see also Jones v. Commander, Kan. Army Ammunitions
Plant, 147 F.R.D. 248, 250 (D. Kan. 1993).
109 8 WIGHT, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 36, § 2008, at 107.
1 0 See Oppenheimer, 437 US. at 351. The Court explained that jurisdiction or venue might
arise during the litigation and that discovery to ascertain the facts bearing on those issues
would be appropriate. Id. at 351 n.13; see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501 (stating that
discovery serves to narrow and clarify the issues and ascertain the facts).
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to allow unbridled discovery either."' The courts have always required
some threshold showing of relevance.112 Yet, the outer limit of discovery
has afforded the allowance of discovery that is reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.113 In consequence, courts
have always been afforded broad discretion in matters of discovery.114
In exercising their discretion, courts have been required to adhere to the
liberal spirit of discovery intended by the rules."5 Yet, Rule 26
recognizes that limitations are properly placed upon discovery by the
court.116
M See Hiclanan, 329 US. at 507; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (allowing protective orders,
upon good cause shown, in order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense); In re Surety Ass'n of America, 388 F.2d 412, 414
(2d Cir. 1967) (stating that parties cannot explore matter that does not appear truly relevant
merely on the theory that it might become so).
112 See Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that "some
threshold showing of relevance must be made before parties are required to open wide the
doors of discovery"); Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891, 899 (2d Cir. 1991) (denying
discovery in an action to confirm an arbitration award where the defendant was engaging
in a fishing expedition to find some basis for arguing that the arbitrator was biased). It is
beyond the scope of this Note to discuss how the courts have interpreted the scope of
discovery standard in individual areas of the law. It should be noted, however, that it has
been interpreted more broadly in some areas than in others. See generally 6 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACICE, supra note 47, 26.46 (discussing the relevance standard as applied in
actions including antitrust, attorney's fees, civil rights, contract, copyright, defamation,
employment, environmental, fraud, insurance, negligence and product liability, patent,
receivership, securities, tax, trade secrets, and trademark).
113 See FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1); see also 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE, supra note 47,
1 26.41[1].
114 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Watson v. Low
County Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992); Todd v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 942 F.2d
1173,1178 (7th Cir. 1991).
11s See Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152. 1158-60 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the district
court failed to adhere to the liberal spirit of Rule 26(b)); Williams v. City of Dothan, 745
F.2d 1406,1415-16 (11th Cir. 1984) (vacating the court's protective order limiting discovery
because the court considered the information requested to be clearly relevant); Bridge
C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
Rule 26 "is not blanket authorization for the court to prohibit disclosure of information
whenever it deems it advisable to do so").
116 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2). The rule sets out certain matters for the court to consider
when setting limitations upon discovery, including the cumulative or duplicative nature of
the discovery, the party's ability to obtain the information requested from some other,
more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive source, and whether the benefit is
outweighed by the burden or expense of the discovery requested through consideration of
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of
the issues, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues. Id.; see,
e.g., Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 332, 336 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (restricting
depositions in a products liability case such that all 18 people who had received a
memorandum describing the prototype vehicles' seat belt restraint system that had
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The 2000 amendment to the scope of discovery standard does not
abandon the purpose of discovery; rather, it refocuses the parties and
realigns their respective responsibilities 1 7 Under the new Rule 26(b)(1),
the scope of discovery remains as broad as it was prior to the
amendment.118 As before, parties are entitled to discover information
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." 9 Now, however,
the parties must make a showing of good cause to the court before they
can access information that is relevant to the subject matter. 20
The amendment forces the parties to focus on discovering
information that is relevant to their case's claims and defenses.1 21 It also
removes the ability to develop new claims and defenses not already
identified in the pleadings by engaging in a broad search for
information. 12 Now, the parties are only entitled to non-privileged
information that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.123 The
allegedly failed could not be deposed); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434,1444 (D.
Kan. 1995) (restricting discovery requested by employee so as not to require employer to
gather information from 1700 personnel files when the information already provided by
the employer should have been sufficient for the employee to make a preliminary
determination as to whether the company treated employee's ethnic group differently); see
also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c); Herbert, 441 US. at 177 (indicating that courts should not neglect
their power to restrict discovery when necessary to avoid annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense). But see, e.g., Travelers Rental Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 116 F.R.D. 140,145 (M.D. N.C. 1989) (allowing depositions of automobile manufacturer
executives even though somewhat duplicative and cumulative).
17 See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
's FRCP 26(b)(1), as amended, provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause
shown, the court may order diswvery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject
to the limitations imposed by subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
i19 Id.
1mid.
121 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
122 ld.
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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purpose in this initial narrowed discovery scope is to address the rising
costs of litigation related to broad discovery. 124
The amendment also realigns the parties' responsibilities in the
discovery process.12s First, parties are free to engage in 'party-controlled'
or 'attorney-managed' discovery, which involves the discovery of
information relevant to the claims or defenses of the parties. 26 If the
parties are unable to agree as to whether a discovery request meets this
relevancy standard, the responsibility shifts to the court.1'2 The court
must then decide if the discovery sought is relevant to the claims or
defenses of the parties. 28 If it is not, the court must next determine
whether it is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, and, if
so, whether there is good cause to permit the broader discovery
sought' 29  This realignment of responsibilities in the amendment is
designed to address the need for court involvement, which is believed to
be an important method in controlling the persistent problems of over-
broad discovery.13
The Advisory Committee conceded that the dividing line between
the new standard for attorney-managed discovery and the new standard
for court-managed discovery cannot be precisely defined.131 It was the
124 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note; see also Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 520
(stating that the persistence of complaints about the expense of broad discovery caused the
Committee to address amendments to the discovery rules).12 s See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee stated that it
intended more action by the court to regulate the extent of discovery in cases involving
contentious or sweeping discovery. Id. Some commentators have long argued that the
court needed to take a more active role in the discovery process. See generally Mark A.
Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Refim': The Continuing Need for an Umpire, 31
SYRACUSE L REv. 543, 592-99 (1980) (discussing the similar proposals made by the
American Bar Association's Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse and the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules that the rules be amended to provide for early judicial
control of discovery).
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
127 See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note. The Committee noted that the rule
"signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and
defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement




131 Id. Under the new standard for attorney-managed discovery, discovery of information
relevant to the parties' claims and defenses is allowed. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1). Under
both the old standard and the new standard for court-managed discovery, parties are
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Advisory Committee's expressed hope that reasonable lawyers will
cooperate at the attorney-managed discovery level so that the court does
not have to become involved. 32 However, if the court is required to
become involved, the Advisory Committee's advice to the courts is to
decide what discovery to allow according to the reasonable needs of the
claims by considering the circumstances of the case, the nature of the
claims and defenses, and the scope of the discovery requested.13 All of
this aside, however, one of the main concerns with the amendment is
that pleading practice in the federal courts will return to pre-1938 fact
pleading.134 Accordingly, this is where one of the controversies lies in
the amendment to Rule 26(b)(1).135 Next, this Note examines the alleged
ramification of the amendment to the scope of discovery standard upon
notice pleading.
m. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGED EFFECr OF THE NEW RULE 26(b)(1) UPON
NOTIcE PLEADING
The re-examination of the discovery rules by the Advisory
Committee involved an endeavor to determine if the full disclosure
required by discovery was too expansive, as well as to determine
whether amendment to the discovery rules could make discovery more
efficient and satisfying to the parties.136 The overriding question facing
allowed to obtain information relevant to the subject matter. See id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
(1999).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
133 d.
'3 See Beckerman, supra note 102, at 541; Lisa Gelhaus, Proposed Rule Changes Narrow
Discovery, Limit Depositions, and Restrict Expert Testimony, TRIAL, Jan. 2000, at 14; Joseph,
supra note 102, at 391; Pearl Zuchlewski, Proposed Amendments May Transform Federal Civil
Discovery Rules, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1999, at 1. According to Judge Niemeyer, the combination
of notice pleading and broad discovery cannot be undone because it has become
"embedded in the infrastructure of American civil procedure." Niemeyer, supra note 1, at
520. Judge Niemeyer was the chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee that drafted the
2000 amendments. Id.
13 There have been many other ramifications raised by those concerned with the new
amendment, including the effect upon the many years of caselaw and the effect upon the
judiciary because of increased judicial involvement. See generally Beckerman, supra note
102. at 540-41 (arguing that the amendment is a "radical, pro-defendant novelty" that will
result in stonewalling and discovery disputes); Thomburg, supra note 99, at 249-59 (arguing
that the amendment will decrease information exchange, increase costs and make many
years of case law obsolete); Zuchlewski, supra note 134, at 1 (arguing that the amendment
will engender massive motion practice). A thorough discussion of these and other
ramifications, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
136 Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 518. A report issued in 1991 claimed that "over 80 percent of
the time and cost of a typical lawsuit involve[d] pre-trial examination of facts through
discovery." Id. (quoting PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON CoMPrmnVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL
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the Advisory Committee was whether the same full disclosure and
discovery exchange that had become so common in federal practice
could be accomplished at a lower cost.137 As such, the Advisory
Committee embarked upon its task of amending the scope of discovery
standard with two assumptions.3 First, it recognized that notice
pleading had to be maintained.139 Second, it acknowledged that full
disclosure through discovery was an accepted and essential element of
litigation140
At first glance, Rule 26(b)(1)'s amendment only appears to involve a
change in wording and a realignment of discovery responsibilities.141
REFORM IN AMERICA (1991)). Additionally, a 1997 survey of lawyers conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center revealed that eighty-three percent of the respondents thought that
changes to the discovery rules were required. Id. at 520 (citing Thomas F Willing et al,
Federal Judicial Center, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993
Federal Rules Amendments, 39 B.C. L REv. 525, 543 (1998)). This same survey revealed that
discovery costs represented about fifty percent of litigation costs, Id. at 521-22. In conIrast,
a study conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice revealed that the cost of
discovery was not a problem in the "typical" case but appeared only in a minority of cases.
Id. at 522 (citing JAMES E. KAKALIK Er AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSICE, DISCOVERY
MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT EVALUATION DATA §
II(B) (1998), reprinted in 39 B.C. L REV. 613 (1998)). The committee did not embark upon its
task of drafting amendments to the discovery rules without first seeking the advice and
opinions of many well-respected experts in the field of civil rules and discovery. Id. at 521;
see also Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L REV. 809, 809 n.al
(1998). In 1997, a conference was held at Boston College Law School for the committee to
gather data, opinions, ideas, and proposals for its reexamination of the discovery rules.
Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 521; see also Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform,
supra, at 809-40. After the conference, which allowed the committee to hear from academic
experts, judges and plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, Judge Niemeyer concluded that
first, the elimination of full disclosure of relevant information was not advocated; second,
discovery worked effectively in routine cases; third, active use of discovery was thought to
be unnecessarily expensive and burdensome; fourth, there was a universal belief that
greater judicial involvement would reduce the cost of discovery disputes; and fifth,
discovery costs could be reduced by limiting the scope of discovery. Niemeyer, supra note
1, at 523; see also Transcript of the 'Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, supra, at 839-40.
137 Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (November 12-13, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rues/Minutes/1198civilminutes.htn (last visited May 9,2002);
Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (March 16-17, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0398dvilminutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002);
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Meeting Minutes (une 18-19,1998), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ 0698standingminutes.htm (last visited May
9,2002).
138 Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 520.
139Id.
140 Id.
14! See supra Part II.C; cf. Beckerman, supra note 102. at 510-11 (stating that the change in the
relevance language "is basically a semantic change unlikely to have much salutary effect on
the conduct of discovery in the hurly-burly world of litigation," but that it will generate
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However, it is argued that the ramifications of the new Rule 26(b)(1)
may go well beyond refocusing the parties and shifting the
responsibilities. 142 The amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) may even undo the
current notice pleading requirements of the FRCP.143
In effect, critics argue that the new "claim or defense" language will
force plaintiffs to draft fact-specific, particularized pleadings in order to
have access to needed discovery. 144 Since its inception, the FRCP
more discovery disputes and the greater need for judicial intervention); AU-ABA Panel
Gives Mostly Favorable Assessment to Proposed Rules Changes, FED. DSCOVERY NEWS, Oct. 11,
1999 (citing a prominent San Francisco trial lawyer as indicating that the change to the
scope of discovery standard is a matter of form rather than substance, and that the
amendment will likely fail to have the desired effect).
142 Numerous groups have presented arguments for a decrease in allowable discovery for
many years. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rule Making, 46 STAN. L REV.
1393, 1400-24 (1994) (tracing sources and history of groups urging curtailment of
discovery). With respect to the 2000 amendment, there were both proponents for and
against change. In making the amendment, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee was
influenced by defendants, especially those in products liability, securities and antitrust
cases, corporate constituents, the plaintiff-based Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the
Defense Research Institute. Thomburg, supra note 99, at 244-45. See generally Transcript of
"Alumni" Panel, supra note 136, at 809.
"4 Beckerman, supra note 102, at 541; Joseph, supra note 102, at 391; Zuchlewski, supra note
134, at 1. This argument was made in letters of public comment to and hearings before the
Advisory Committee by organizations including the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, the United States Department of Justice, the Eastern District of New York
Commission on Civil Litigation, the Chicago Council of Lawyers Federal Courts
Committee, the Federal Practice Section of the Connecticut Bar Association, the Nebraska
Association of Trial Attorneys, the New Mexico Trial Lawyers, and the Federal Bar
Association for the Western District of Washington. See Summary of Public Comments 76-
81, 85-86, 97-98, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/summary.pdf (last visited
May 9, 2002). Other individuals, including attorneys, academics, and judges, have also
made this argument. Id.; see also Mimi Azrael, New Federal Discovery Rules to Take Effect
December 1, 33 MD. BAR J., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 56 (stating that under the new rule plaintiffs
are encouraged to file multi-count complaints in order to "level the discovery playing
field").
14 See Beckerman, supra note 102, at 541; Morgan Cloud, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal
Discovery Rules and the Future of Adversarial Litigation, 74 TEMP. L REV. 27, 51-52 (2001);
Joseph, supra note 102, at 391; Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules
Amendments, 22 CARDOZO L REV. 75, 83 (2000); Zuchlewski, supra note 134, at 1. But see
Cloud, supra, at 51 (2001) (indicating that the amendment may provide an incentive for
attorneys to plead more broadly by including all possible claims and defenses in their
pleadings in order to expand the issues raised); Tobias, supra, at 83 (indicating that the
amendment may encourage plaintiffs to draft broader pleadings in order to secure
increased discovery).
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replaced the need for fact or code pleading with notice pleading.145 After
significant resistance, notice pleading finally became imbedded in
federal court practice and procedure.146 It has been argued that in order
for notice pleading to work, there must be liberal discovery so that the
pleadings need only contain a "generalized statement" giving notice of
the claims or defenses.147 Support for this argument is specifically found
in Conley v. Gibson,148 wherein the Supreme Court indicated that liberal
discovery allows for the simplified pleading required by the FRCP. 149
The counter-argument is found in the Advisory Committee's
intentions. 150 The Advisory Committee did not intend to discard the
requirement of notice pleading; instead, the Advisory Committee
specifically assumed that notice pleading had to be maintained. 51 In
145 See supra Part II.A. Notice pleading is a system of pleading practice wherein a party
need only provide notice of claims through "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It also requires
that a party notify other parties of defenses by using "short and plain terms." See FED. R.
Cv. P. 8(b).
146 See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text Notice pleading has also become
imbedded in the pleading rules of many state courts. See generally ALA. R. CIV. P. 8; ALASKA
K. Civ. P. 8; ARIz. R. Civ. P. 8; COLO. . Civ. P. 8; DEL SUPEP. Cr. Civ. R. 8; DEL CH. CT. R. 8;
DEL COM. P. Cr. Civ. R. 8; DEL FAM. Cr. Civ. K 8; HAW. R. CIV. P. 8; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1);
IND. T. R. 8; IOWA R. Civ. P. 70(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-208(a) (1999); KY. R. CIV P. 8.01; ME.
R. Civ. P. 8; MAS. R. Civ. P. 8; MINN. DsT. CT. GEN. R. 8.01; Mis. R. Civ. P. 8; MONT. R. Civ.
P. 8(a); NEV. R Civ. P. 8; N.M. Disr Cr. R. Civ. P. 1-008; N.D. R. Civ. P. 8; 01O R. CIV. P. 8;
R.I. R. Civ. P. 8; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-8(a) (2001); TENN. CIV. P. R. 8; UTAH R. CIV. P. 8;
VT. R. CrW. P. 8; WASH. Ci. R. 8; W. VA. R. CIV. P. 8; WYO. R. CIV. P. 8. The FRCP have
separately established particularity in pleading fraud or mistake. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Additionally, heightened pleading requirements have been developed by the courts in
several specific areas of litigation, such as in cases involving civil rights, securities, and
antitrust. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'd 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (involving a civil rights case);
Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (involving an
antitrust case); Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 760 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(involving a securities case). In Leatherman, the Supreme Court reaffirmed notice pleading
and effectively ended the ability of the lower courts to require heightened pleading
requirements. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-69. The Court indicated that heightened
pleading could not be required without specific amendment to the FRCP. Id. Clearly,
notice pleading is embedded in our system of civil procedure. See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Reaffirmation of Notice Pleading, TRIAL, June 1993, at 73 (discussing the implication of the
Leatherman decision upon heightened pleading requirements).
47 Beckerman, supra note 1OZ at 535.
14 355 U.S. 41,47-48 (1955).
149 Id. ("Such simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the hlb-al opportunity for
discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more
precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed
facts and issues."); see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.150 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
In See Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 520.
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drafting the new scope of discovery standard, the Advisory Committee
did not discard the liberal scope of discovery formerly recognized under
the FRCP.152 All that the rule does is realign the responsibilities for
discovery.5s
The Advisory Committee's practical intention was to encourage
judicial control by expanding the occasions for seeking it.'% In allowing
for attorney-managed and court-managed tiers of discovery, the
Advisory Committee intended that reasonable attorneys would be able
to cooperate and appropriately manage discovery without the need for
judicial involvement.'3 It concluded that discovery under the old
system was working well in the majority of routine civil cases.'-% As
such, it is inferred that the Advisory Committee found that with a
pleading sufficient under the requirements of notice pleading, the
attorneys would be capable of determining the content of the claims and
defenses and what discovery and disclosure would be relevant to those
claims and defenses without the need for either fact-specific pleading or
judicial involvement.7 Therefore, responsible and cooperative
involvement of the lawyers should require nothing more than notice
pleading in order to obtain discovery related to the claims and defenses
of the parties.
Critics have also argued that the "claim or defense" language will
force more specific pleading, especially from plaintiffs, so that attorneys
cannot resist obvious discovery at the attorney-managed level of the
two-tiered discovery system.158 The discovery rules themselves provide
152 The broad "subject matter discovery is still allowed under the rule. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). The only difference is that now, without a stipulation between the parties, the
parties must request the permission of the court to obtain this broad scope of discovery. Id.
1 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
-u Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (March 16-17, 1998), availabe at
http://www.uscourt.gov/rules/ Minutes/0398civilminutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002).
155 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
15% See Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 52; see also Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
Meeting Minutes (January 8-9, 1999), availab/e at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/stl-98.htm (last visited May 9, 2002); Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure Meeting Minutes (une 18-19, 1998), auailab/e at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/o698standingminutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002). Given that discovery
works well in the majority of routine civil cases, instead of amending the scope of
discovery standard relative to all cases, maybe the Advisory Committee should have
considered creating discovery rules for the non-routine cases. A discussion of this
alternative is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
157 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
" Joseph, supra note 102, at 391.
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the counter-argument. 159 The discovery rules are organized to deal with
obvious discovery resistance.160 Pursuant to the FRCP, a party can bring
a motion to compel disclosure or responses to discovery, which would
certainly be granted in favor of the party requesting discovery if the
requested information is related to a claim or defense or, if related to the
subject matter, good cause is shown.161 Therefore, notice pleading
should not be replaced by more fact specific pleading in order to avoid
discovery resistance because the rules are already equipped to handle
this problem.162
Unfortunately, the cooperation among the attorneys and the
functioning of the discovery rules would only solve the identified
problem in a perfect world. The world of discovery is not, and never has
been, perfect.1 3 Problems will arise under the new scope of discovery
159 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
16 See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 37. Rule 37 allows a party to seek an order compelling
disclosure or discovery from a party who is resisting disclosure or discovery or providing
evasive or incomplete answers. FED. R. CrV. P. 37(a)(2)-(3). If the motion is granted, the
opposing party may be required to pay reasonable expenses incurred in bringing the
motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). The rule also provides for sanctions to be imposed upon
parties who fail to comply with the court's order regarding disclosure or discovery. FED. R.
Crv. P. 37(b).
161 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Increased discovery motion practice, requiring increased judicial
involvement, is, to many opponents, another disfavored ramification of the amendment.
Beckerman, supra note 102, at 541 (indicating that there will be an increase in the number of
discovery disputes because defense lawyers would use the amended scope provisions to an
even greater extent to resist discovery); Joseph, supra note 102, at 391 (suggesting that Rule
12 motion practice will increase); Zuchlewski, supra note 134, at 1 (indicating that the
amendment will "spawn massive motion practice" to determine whether discovery
requests are permissibly relevant).
162 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37. In fact, the court has broad discretion in fashioning sanctions
under Rule 37 for a party's failure to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery. See, e.g.,
United States v. Big D. Enters., 184 F.3d 924, 936 (8th Cir. 1999); Langley by Langley v.
Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1997). See generally Spain v. Bd. of Educ., 214 F.3d
925 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding dismissal of principal's civil rights suit for principal's failure
to attend pretrial conference, provide initial disclosures, answer interrogatories, pay
previously ordered sanctions, prepare for pretrial conference, and attend another pretrial
conference).
163 See generally Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Assoc'ed Growers of Harlem, Inc.,
54 F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (stating that the vision that discovery will be conducted
by "skilled gentlemen of the bar, without wrangling and without the intervention of the
court," is an "unreal dream"). One reason for the imperfect world of discovery arises from
what have been identified as the five primary objectives of litigating lawyers: "(1) to win;
(2) to make money; (3) to avoid being sued for malpractice; (4) to earn the admiration of the
professional community; and (5) to develop self-esteem for the quality of their
performance." Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L REV. 1295, 1311 (1978). Brazil maintains that it is the
pursuit of victory; however, that naturally dominates all of the other objectives because the
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standard as litigants attempt to determine the impact of the rule.1" As
such, the next Part of this Note introduces Mississippi's similar scope of
discovery standard and reviews the judiciary's interpretation of that
standard.
IV. IT CAN BE DONE: A LOOK AT THE CO-EXISTENCE OF NOTCE PLEADING
AND A SIMILAR SCOPE OF DISCOVERY STANDARD IN MISSISSIPPI
A. Comparison Between the Federal and Mississippi's Notice Pleading
Requirements and Scope of Discovery Standards
The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure (MRCP) are modeled after
the FRCP.165 Like the FRCP, the MRCP require that the pleadings set
forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief."1" Additionally, in Mississippi as in the federal
courts, the role of pleadings is diminished and relatively unimportant 167
Like the federal pleading rule, the purpose of Mississippi's pleading rule
is to require the pleadings to give notice of the underlying claims.168
Also like the FRCP, the MRCP provide practitioners with an appendix of
forms that are virtually identical to those provided in the FRCP.169 Thus,
the MRCP call for a system of notice pleading that is very similar to that
of the FRCP.170
others flow from victory. Id. As such, Brazil postulates that the "adversary pressures and
competitive economic impulses inevitably work to impair significantly, if not to frustrate
completely, the attainment of the discovery system's primary objective." Id. at 1303.
164 See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes (March 16-17, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ rules/Minutes/0398civilrninutes.htm (last visited May 9,2002)
("Tlhe very fact of change will lead to a transitional period in which contending parties
seek to attribute unintended meanings to the change.").
165 See, e.g., Stanton & Assoc., Inc. v. Bryant Constr. Co., 464 So. 2d 499, 505 n.5 (Miss. 1985)
(stating that Mississippi's rules are patterned after the federal rules).166 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with Miss. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
167 Stanton, 464 So. 2d at 505 n.6; see also Witt v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 63, 67 (Miss. 1983)
(Robertson, J., concurring). As to the diminished importance of the pleadings in the federal
courts, see supra text accompanying notes 56-59, 66.
160 Miss. R. Crv. P. 8(a)(1) advisory committee's commenL The old practice in Mississippi of
requiring the pleadings to state the facts and narrow the issues was defeated by adoption
of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Id.; see also Stanton, 464 So. 2d at 505 n.6.
169 See MISS. R. CIV. P. app. (2000); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. app. (2000).
17 See MISS. R. Cirv. P. 8(a)(1). But see Stanton, 464 So. 2d at 505 n.6 (declining to address
whether Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 8 actually adopts the theory of "notice
pleading").
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Likewise, the scope of discovery standard of the MRCP is similar to
that under the new FRCP.171 Rule 26(b)(1) of the MRCP allows discovery
of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by
the claims or defenses of any party."l"2 The new FRCP Rule 26(b)(1)
allows discovery of "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party."' 3 Both allow discovery of information
related to the claims or defenses of the parties and, clearly, an "issue" is
related to a claim or defense. Also like the new FRCP Rule 26(b)(1),
MRCP Rule 26(b)(1) replaced Mississippi's former statute that allowed
discovery of information relevant to the "subject matter" of the suit.174
Finally, like the drafters of FRCP Rule 26(b)(1), the drafters of MRCP
Rule 26(b)(1) realized the difficulty in determining the difference
between information related to "issues" and information related to
"subject matter." 175 However, the drafters of MRCP Rule 26 offered a
little more guidance by indicating that MRCP Rule 26(b)(1) favors
discovery limitations rather than expansions because the amendment
was intended to deter sweeping and abusive discovery practices. 176 The
drafters also explained that discovery should be limited to the specific
practices or acts in issue in a claim.177
Mississippi has been operating in a system where notice pleading
and a scope of discovery standard like that of the new FRCP Rule
26(b)(1) have co-existed since 1982.178 A review of Mississippi caselaw
reveals how this has succeeded and demonstrates that it can succeed in
171 See Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Mississippi's old discovery rule modeled the old FRCP
26(b)(1). MiSS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-226(b) (1972); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (1999); see also
Miss. R. CV. P. 26 advisory comittee's comment. The old discovery rule was amended
and the new discovery rule, MRCP 26(b)(1), became effective in 1982. See Miss. R CIV. P.
26.
1 MW. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
173 FED. R Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
174 MiSs. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's comment (ciing Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-226
(1972)). The Committee recognized that the former statute allowed sweeping and abusive
discovery and decided that "discovery should be limited to the specific practices or acts
that are in issue." Id.
175 Id. The federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee has also commented regarding the
difficulty in determining the difference. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note;
see also supra text accompanying note 131.
176 Miss. K Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's comment.
1
77ld.
378 See Miss. R. Crv. P. 26.
20021 705
Childers: Keep on Pleading:  The Co-Existence of Notice Pleading and the Ne
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
706 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
the federal procedural system.179 Next, this Note reviews the judicial
interpretation of this similar standard by the Mississippi courts.
B. Review of Judicial Interpretation of Mississippi's Scope of Discovery
Standard
The Mississippi Supreme Court has addressed Mississippi's scope of
discovery standard on a few occasions, providing guidance to
interpretation of the scope of discovery standard of MRCP Rule 26(b)(1).
In American Tobacco Co. v. Evans,180 the Mississippi Supreme Court
addressed the scope of discovery as it relates to the discoverability of a
manufacturer's trade secrets and other confidential research
development or commercial information.' 8' In American Tobacco, the
widow and father of Nathan Horton filed a wrongful death action
against American Tobacco and a distributor of its tobacco products
alleging that Nathan developed and died from lung cancer by smoking
"Pall Mall" cigarettes. 182 The complaint alleged a strict liability tort,
claiming that American Tobacco sold and distributed to Nathan an
unreasonably dangerous or defective product and that Nathan's use of
the product resulted in his death.183 During discovery, the Hortons
served written interrogatories on American Tobacco requesting
American Tobacco to identify all additives in Pall Mall cigarettes and its
wrapping paper.184 American Tobacco objected to the interrogatory on
several grounds, which included an allegation that the information was
irrelevant to the issues raised by the Hortons' claims.8 5 In an effort to
" See infra Part IV.B.
IB) 508 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1987).
1Id. at 1057.
2 Id.
l Id. at 1060.
I4 Id. at 1058. The interrogatory specifically read:
8. Please identify, by scientific name, generic name and chemical
formula, all additives, chemical or otherwise, in Pall Mall cigarettes
and its wrapping paper, and:
(a) State whether or not each additive or material has ever been
determined or suspected to be carcinogenic, cocarcinogenic, a tumor
initiator, or to yield nitrosamines;
(b) Identify tests, analyses, or research you have conducted, or had
conducted on your behalf, to determine the properties and/or health
hazards of each additive or material.
Id.
' AId. at 1058. The Hortons filed a motion to compel and American Tobacco opposed the
motion, indicating that revelation of such information would materially damage its
marketability as a competitive tobacco product. Id. The lower court ordered American
Tobacco to disclose the additives, subject to a protective order. Id. at 1058-59. American
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show that the information requested was irrelevant and to avoid
disclosure, American Tobacco attempted to redefine the Hortons' claims
by asserting that it was actually the smoke that caused Nathan's death,
not the additives in the cigarettes. 86
The court held that, in the context of the facts and circumstances of
the Hortons' case, a party opponent is entitled to discovery of the
requested information18 7 The court reasoned that the nature of the
claims asserted by the Hortons made the information regarding
additives both relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses and
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.188
The court admonished that a party cannot attempt to redefine the
contours of an adversary's claim or defense and thus limit discovery,
because mischief would result and it is the plaintiffs' prerogative to
define their own claim.189
Specifically addressing discovery of information in similar cases, the
court noted that the judiciary is ill-equipped to determine whether
plaintiffs need access to the chemical components of cigarettes or the
contents of their smoke.190 The court indicated that it should be left to
the plaintiffs and their counsel, who carry the burden of proving all of
the elements of their product liability claims, to competently make such a
determination."1 The court further noted that allowing the decision to
be made by those best equipped to make it was a matter of institutional
fairness and practical necessity."2
Finally, responding to the Hortons' claim that disclosure of the
information was necessary, the court emphasized that MRCP Rule
Tobacco sought a writ of prohibition from the Mississippi Supreme Court to reverse the
order of disclosure. Id. at 1059.186 American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057,1060 (Miss. 1987). The court found this
attempt to redefine the claim to be specious and restrictive. Id.
7 Id. at 1057. The court indicated that such discoverability was subject to a carefully
drawn protective order. Id. The court further indicated that there is no trade secrets
exception to the general scope of discovery as defined by Miss. R Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Id. The
court did, however, uphold the protective order since the information being disclosed
involved American Tobacco's trade secrets. Id. at 1061-6Z
IN Id. at 1061. The Hortons claimed that in order to establish the defective product claim,
they had to have access to the components of the cigarettes. Id. The Hortons also claimed
that discovery of the information was necessary to determine whether any other
ingredients were carcinogenic or toxic. Id.
9 ld. at 1060.
190 Id.
191 Id.
19 American Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057,1060 (Miss. 1987).
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26(b)(1) does not include an element of necessity as a prerequisite to
discoverability.193 The court further emphasized that such a judicial
determination before allowing discovery is both legally inappropriate
and practically impossible.194 The court stressed that all that a party
needs to show for discoverability is that the information sought lies
within the scope of discovery allowed by MRCP Rule 26(b)(1); that is,
that the information is "relevant to the issues raised by the claims or
defenses of any party."195 The Hortons met this burden and, therefore,
were entitled to the information without the need for a showing of
necessity.196
The Mississippi Supreme Court next addressed the scope of
discovery standard of MRCP Rule 26(b)(1) in Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control
Co.197 In Dawkins, the plaintiffs purchased a home that they later found
to be termite infested, even though they had received a pre-sale
certificate from Redd indicating that it was noLt19 A complaint filed
against Redd alleged that Redd either fraudulently or with gross
negligence provided the Dawkinses with a written certificate that
indicated that Redd had inspected the house and had observed no visible
evidence of infestation.19' The Dawkinses also claimed that Redd never
performed the inspection, thereby failing to discover the readily visible
infestation.2  The Dawkinses further alleged that Redd knew that the
representations were false and that the Dawkinses would rely on those
representations2 0
In discovery, the Dawkinses requested information relating to all
persons for whom the particular inspector had performed a pre-sale
termite inspecti6n for approximately five years prior to the sale.202 Redd
19 Id. at 1061.
194 Id.
195 Id.; see also MISS. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
1% American Tobacco, 508 So. 2d at 1061.
197 607 So. 2d 1232 (Miss. 1992).




Id. at 1234. Interrogatory number 4 read:
Please provide the name, last known address and telephone number of
each and every person for whom Murray Strickland (acting as an
employee of Defendant) has performed or purportedly performed at
any time since January 1, 1985, a pre-sale termite inspection or has
filled out a form similar to the form attached to the Complaint herein
as Exhibit "A."
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objected to the request as being, among other things, irrelevant.X3 A
motion to compel responses to discovery was filed and the request was
found by the trial court to be beyond the scope of permissible
discovery. 4 The case proceeded to trial and the evidence regarding
Redd's prior inspections, which may have established the plaintiffs'
claims, was excluded during the trial.ms
The appeal filed by the Dawkinses involved the propriety of the
underlying court's pre-trial discovery ruling and questioned its effect on
the presentation of evidence at the trial. 206 The Dawkinses argued that
the information sought was relevant to the issue of fraudulent intent,
stating that they were "casting their nets for evidence of other fraudulent
acts."W7 Redd argued that the reports were irrelevant because the
plaintiffs were attempting an improper fishing expedition under the
MRCP.2m Redd also argued that the intent of the MRCP was to prevent
fishing expeditions and limit the scope of discovery to issues in the
case.209 The court held that evidence of similar occurrences is relevant
for purposes of discovery and that the Dawkinses were entitled to the
information. 210
2m Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (Miss. 1992). The other
objections raised by Redd included that the interrogatory request was overreaching and
unduly burdensome. Id.
AM Id.
2 5 I d. The trial court would not allow the plaintiffs' claims for fraud, gross negligence and
punitive damages to be submitted to the jury, and instead the jury considered only the
issue of negligence. Id. at 1234-35.
2 Id. at 1235.
W7 Id.
I2 ld. As to fishing expeditions and the FRCP, the United States Supreme Court has
indicated that the "fishing expedition" objection cannot be used to preclude a party from
obtaining discovery. Herbert v. Lando, 441 US. 153,177 (1979); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 US. 340,350 (1978); Harris v. Nelson, 394 US. 286,297 (1969); Schlagerthauf v.
Holder, 379 US. 104, 114-15 (1964); see also United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th
Cir. 1991). Some courts have denied discovery, however, when a party appeared to be
attempting a fishing expedition. See Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891, 899 (2d Cir.
1991) (denying discovery in an action to confirm an arbitration award where the defendant
was engaging in a fishing expedition to find some basis for arguing that the arbitrator was
biased); MacKnight v. Leonard Morse Hosp., 828 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing the
subject parties to a fishing expedition when the plaintiff did not suggest any reasonable
basis that discovery would uncover what plaintiff was looking for).
m9 Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So. 2d 1232,1235 (Miss. 1992).
20 Id. at 1236. The court concluded that the lower court abused its discretion in failing to
compel a response to the discovery. Id. The court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings wherein the Dawkinses would be allowed to obtain the requested
discovery. Id.
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The court reviewed guidelines to be utilized in applying the court's
discretion in matters of discovery 211 First, courts should follow the
general policy that discovery be encouraged.2' 2 Second, disputed facts
should be construed in favor of allowing discovery.2 3 Third, after
consideration of the importance of the information as weighed against
the hardship and costs of production and availability through other
means, it is preferable that limitations on discovery be partial rather than
an outright denial.2 14
Finally, although it is a case involving attorney misconduct, the
Mississippi Supreme Court addressed MRCP Rule 26(b)(1) and made
some interesting insights related to the scope of discovery standard in
Mississippi Bar v. Land.215 Attorney Land was charged with misconduct
in a civil action wherein the plaintiff brought a personal injury claim
against a homeowner for an eye injury he sustained while driving by the
home.216 The plaintiff believed his injury occurred as a result of a rock
being thrown from a lawn mower.217 In fact, the homeowner's son shot a
BB gun toward the road at the time of the injury and believed that he
shot the plaintiff.2' 8 This fact was known to the homeowner, was
revealed to the insurance company and attorney Land, and was
211 Id. (citing 23 AM. JuR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 5 (1983) (citations omitted)).
212 [d.
213 Id.
214 Id.; see also Swan v. I.P., Inc., 613 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1993) (addressing the Miss. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1) scope of discovery standard). In Swan, a school teacher filed a claim alleging injury
as a result of exposure to fumes and spray of roofing materials used to re-roof the school
where she taught. Swan, 613 So. 2d at 847. Her claims were based on negligence, strict
liability and breach of warranty. id. at 848. During discovery, the defendants noticed the
depositions of the plaintiff and sixteen school children, who were also allegedly exposed to
the chemicals. Id. at 857. Four of the depositions were taken, but the plaintiff and the other
schoolchildren sought protective orders on the grounds of relevance and cumulativeness.
Id. The trial court overruled the protective order but strictly limited the extent to which the
defendants could inquire about the physical conditions of the deponents by confining
inquiry to symptoms and treatment during a three-day period only. Id. On appeal, the
court held that the physical condition of the students after the time period was relevant to
the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 858. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs contention that she
suffered many adverse effects long after the limited time period rendered the students'
conditions relevant since they were exposed to the same chemicals for a similar period of
time. Id.
21s 653 So. 2d 899 (Miss. 1994). For an analysis regarding the effect of the case as it relates to
the rules of professional conduct in Mississippi, see Katherine A. Smith, Truth or Dare: The
Rules of Professional Conduct and Stretching the Discovery Boundaries, 16 MISS. C L RMV. 455
(1996).
216 Land, 653 So. 2d at 900.
M7 Id.
M Id. at 900-01
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contained within a report prepared by an insurance representative 2' 9
Attorney Land was aware of the report regarding the BB gun incident, as
well as a photograph of the gun. 0 Attorney Land decided that the
information regarding the BB gun did not relate to the civil action and
would not be disclosed.22
The plaintiffs complaint alleged that the injury occurred as a result
of the lawn mower and did not assert any alternative theories of
causation.mn Through discovery, the plaintiff sought certain information
that should have prompted attorney Land to disclose the information
about the BB gun incident or to submit the matter to the court for
decision, for instance by way of a protective order.2 Instead, attorney
Land withheld information and gave misleading, deceptive, and false
responses.224 The plaintiffs inadvertent discovery of the information
through a mistaken delivery of the file to his counsel's office culminated
in the misconduct proceedings against attorney Land.225
During the attorney misconduct proceedings, Land argued that the
information about the BB gun was irrelevant, relying upon the comment
to MRCP Rule 26(b)(1) that indicates that discovery should be limited to
the specific practice or acts in issue.226 It was Land's position that
because the complaint did not allege anything about a BB gun, the
information about the BB gun did not have to be disclosed.mv It was
further Land's position that the report was privileged as work product
material and involved information subject to the attorney-client
privilege.2 The court found that the report and photograph were
relevant and material to the issue of causation. 2 The court noted that
the proper procedure that attorney Land should have followed was to
219 Id.
= Id. at 900.
2n Id. Attorney Land specifically noted in his file: "Gun does not relate to civil action as
worded in the Complaint! Do not produce." Id. at 903.
21 iMississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899,906 (Miss. 1994).
- Id. at 907-09.
224 Id.
2n Id. at 904. After plaintiff discovered the information when it was mistakenly delivered
to his counsel's office, the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to allege negligent use of
a BB gun, as well as claims against attorney Land and the insurance company. Id. at 903.
2 Id. at 906; see also Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's comment.
22 Land, 653 So. 2d at 908.
2n Id. at 909.
- id. at 908.
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allow the court to determine the discoverability of the report rather than
providing deceptive responses~mO
Through the aforementioned cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court
set helpful parameters in interpreting its scope of discovery standard,
which provides guidance for establishing just how the federal judiciary
should interpret the new language of FRCP Rule 26(b)(1). Next, this Note
outlines those parameters and provides guidelines for the federal
judiciary to follow in its interpretation of the new scope of discovery
standard in order to maintain notice pleading.
V. GUIDE11NES FOR INTERPRETATION OF FRCP 26(b)(1): MAINTAINING
NOTIcE PLEADING AND THE NEw SCOPE OF DISCOVERY STANDARD IN THE
FEDERAL PROCEDURAL SYSTEM
A. Guidelines for Interpretation of the New Scope of Discovery Standard
The Advisory Committee did not set out to rid the federal
procedural system of notice pleading and, in fact, it realized that notice
pleading is here to stay.231 The Advisory Committee's goal in drafting
the amendment was to reduce the costs of discovery while maintaining
the open disclosure of relevant information.2 2 Its hope was that
attorneys will cooperate to manage discovery.2 3 However, the Advisory
Committee has provided a means for active judicial involvement in the
discovery process, if necessary, to regulate the breadth of sweeping or
contentious discovery.m The Advisory Committee indicated that the
judiciary should determine the actual scope of discovery by considering
the reasonable needs of the action. 5 It gave examples of discovery that
could be considered related to the claims or defenses, depending on the
circumstances of the pending action: other incidents of the same type,
other incidents involving the same product, information about a party's
organizational arrangements or filing systems, and information to
impeach a likely witness.3 The Advisory Committee also indicated that
the good cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to be
no id. at 909.
211 See Niemeyer, supra note 1, at 520.
2n See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (une 18-19, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0698standingminutes.hbn (last visited May 8,
2002).




Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 [2002], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol36/iss3/5
KEEP ON PLEADING
flexible.237 Finally, the Advisory Committee advised that broader
discovery could be permitted if warranted after consideration of the
circumstances of the case, the nature of the claims and defenses, and the
scope of the discovery requested.3
While this advice is certainly helpful, it falls short of providing the
federal judiciary, litigants, or practitioners with a concrete idea of the
difference between subject matter relevancy and claim or defense
relevancy, and additional guidance is necessary.2 39  Therefore, in
interpreting the new scope of discovery standard of FRCP Rule 26(b)(1),
the federal judiciary should adopt and expand the reasoning and rules
employed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in interpretation of its
similar scope of discovery standard.
First and foremost, as a general policy, discovery should be
encouraged. 240 This will uphold the purpose of discovery, which under
the FRCP has been, and should continue to be, definition and
clarification of the issues and ascertainment of the facts.241 This parallels
the Advisory Committee's desire in the amendment process to maintain
full disclosure of information as an important element of the American
discovery system.242
Second, the judiciary should limit its involvement in deciding what
discovery is needed by the parties to prove their claims or defenses. As
such, the party with the burden of proving the elements of a claim
should be allowed to make the decision regarding what discovery is
necessary to prove the claim because that party is best equipped to make
such a decision.243 In American Tobacco, when dealing with the issue of
whether the plaintiffs with a claim against a tobacco company required
knowledge of the additives of a cigarette, the Mississippi Supreme Court
supported leaving this decision to the plaintiffs. 244 This can, of course, be
extended to other types of cases as well.245 The federal courts, on the
237 Id.
z3 Id.
239 See Azrael, supra note 143, at 56.2
40 See Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So. 2d 12321236 (Miss. 1992).
21 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,501 (1947).
242 See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (une 18-19, 1998), availabe at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rues/Minutes/0698standingminutes.htm (last visited May 8,
2002) (stating that "It]he central goal was to reduce the costs of discovery without
undercutting the basic principles of open disclosure of relevant information").2
3 See American Tobacco v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057,1060 (Miss. 1987).
244 Id.
24 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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other hand, are ill-equipped to determine whether particular information
or some other information might be better suited to prove a claim
because it does not even fully know what information is available. 246
Requiring the court to make these types of decisions would only
frustrate the functioning of discovery. Allowing the parties to make
these decisions will heed the instructive warning of the Advisory
Committee, in 1983, that courts should be careful not to deprive a party
of discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair opportunity to
develop and prepare the case.247
Third, courts should not make a determination of, or require a
showing of, necessity. Once a party establishes that the requested
information is within the scope of discovery standard, that is, that the
information requested is not privileged and is relevant to the claims or
defenses of any party, the discovery should be allowed.248 In American
Tobacco, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized this concept in
indicating that such a determination by a court is legally inappropriate
and practically impossible.249 In effect, the judiciary should continue to
allow the parties to manage and control discovery by only requiring that
the relevance standard be met or good cause be shown to, in effect,
broaden that standard. This furthers the goal of the Advisory
Committee that attorneys cooperate for the effective functioning of
discovery.2  Additionally, there is not a necessity requirement in the
rules, only a requirement that the requested discovery be reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.251
Furthermore, once a party meets the discovery scope standard, it seems
obvious that because the information requested is relevant to the parties'
claims or defenses, it is likely necessary for that party's case. By not
requiring a showing of necessity, the court encourages discovery and
allows discovery to fulfill its purposes.
Fourth, the judiciary should only allow the party asserting the claim
or defense to define the contours of the claim or defense. As such, a
party should not be allowed to redefine an opponent's claim or defense
in an attempt to make otherwise discoverable information
undiscoverable. 2 2 The Mississippi Supreme Court applied this concept
246 See American Tobacco, 508 So. 2d at 1060.
W See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 47, 26App.41.249 See American Tobacco, 508 So. 2d at 1061.
9 Id.
25o See FED. R. Cir. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
2s1 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26.
B= See American Tobacco, 508 So. 2d at 1060.
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in American Tobacco when it did not allow the defendant to make certain
discovery irrelevant by indicating that something else caused the
plaintiff's death.2 3 This concept is easily expandable to cases beyond the
type of case involved in American Tobacco.2u By only allowing the party
asserting the claim or defense to define its contours, the court will ensure
that notice pleading is maintained. In this way, a party need only notify
the other party that its claim or defense is based on a particular cause of
action. For example, in Land, it was clear that the plaintiffs claim was
based on negligence, which includes the element of causation.25 It
seems that the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs
pleading of negligence, combined with the request for the report that
contained the alternative theory of causation, should have alerted the
attorney that disclosure was required or at least an issue for the court to
determine.256 So, as long as a party gives notice of his claim or defense,
and, in discovery, requests information that might contain alternative
theories, he is entitled to the discovery and notice pleading is
maintained.257
Fifth, any limitations placed on discovery by the judiciary should be
partial rather than outright denials of discovery. As such, the court
should become involved in crafting appropriate protective orders so that
discovery can still occur. In Dawkins, the Mississippi Supreme Court
recognized the importance of allowing the plaintiffs to discover certain
information in order to attempt to prove their claims, instead of merely
denying the plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain the information at all.m
By allowing partial discovery, courts will uphold the goal of open
discovery while at the same time ensuring that notice pleading is not
replaced by fact-specific pleading. This will occur because a party will
know that it need only give notice of its claims or defenses and that it can
still obtain at least some discovery, which may then lead to allowances of
additional discovery. Otherwise, a party might be forced to plead
specifically so that certain information can be obtained.
253 Id.
2 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text;, see also supra Part VB.
M See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984).
25 See Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 909 (Miss. 1995).
7 See generally Smith, supra note 215, at 455 (stating that when evaluating discovery
requests under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), an attorney should resolve
uncertainties in favor of disclosure or the claim of privilege).
2 See Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So. 2d 123Z 1236 (Miss. 1992).
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In summary, the federal courts should approach discovery disputes
under the new scope of discovery standard of Rule 26(b)(1) based on the
following guidelines. First, discovery should be encouraged. Second,
the judiciary should limit its involvement in deciding what discovery is
needed by the parties to prove their claims or defenses. Third, courts
should not make a determination of, or require a showing of, necessity.
Fourth, only the party asserting the claim or defense should be allowed
to define the contours of the claim or defense. Finally, any limitations
placed on discovery by the judiciary should be partial. rather than
outright denials of discovery. By following these guidelines, along with
those set out by the Advisory Committee in its comments, the federal
judiciary will ensure that notice pleading is maintained in the federal
procedural system. Next, this Note applies these guidelines to the
discovery dispute in the hypothetical case involving Ms. Grier.
B. Hypothetical Case: Analysis of a Discovery Dispute
Ms. Grier's case has reached the point where the attorneys are not
cooperating at the attorney-managed level to determine what discovery
should be allowed.259 As such, the court must step in and first determine
whether Ms. Grier's request for information concerning the last and next
cleaning of the floor and an identification of the materials used falls
within the initial scope standard by being relevant to the parties' claims
and defenses.2w If not, the court's next task is to determine whether the
requested information is relevant to the subject matter and, if so,
whether there is good cause to expand the scope of discovery standard
to allow discovery of the information.61 The defendant objected to
provision of the requested information because Ms. Grier's complaint,
following the notice pleading requirements of the rules, alleged that she
fell as a result of leaking meat juices, which had nothing to do with the
cleaning and waxing of the floors, much less the materials used.
Under the old scope of discovery standard it seems clear that Ms.
Grier would likely be entitled to the discovery because the cleaning of
the floors and the materials used would be considered related to the
subject matter, a concept construed very broadly by the courts.M2
However, under the new scope of discovery standard it is more difficult
to determine whether she is entitled to the requested information. Ms.
See supra Part I.
2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
261 Id.
W' See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
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Grier did not allege in her complaint that the cleaning and waxing of the
floors was somehow involved in causing her to slip and fail. Rather, she
claimed that the defendant was negligent but alleged only that the
leaking meat juice was the source of this negligence and the cause of her
injuries. Regardless, the condition of the floor is certainly related to her
claim, as well as potentially related to the notice defense.
Consideration of the guidelines elicited from the cases decided by
the Mississippi Supreme Court reveals that the requested discovery
should be allowed. By allowing Ms. Grier to obtain the requested
information, the court will certainly encourage discovery. Next, by
making the request, Ms. Grier indicates that she has decided that she
needs the information to prove her claims or disprove the defendant's
defenses. As such, the judiciary should limit its involvement to deciding
whether this discovery is actually needed and should not require Ms.
Grier to show necessity. Additionally, Ms. Grier has defined the
contours of her claim to include all negligence by the defendant by
asserting that the defendant was "negligent." The fact that the
defendant's negligence actually arose out of another set of circumstances
than those pleaded by Ms. Grier should not stall any efforts at discovery
of information that would lead to discovery of the defendant's actual
negligence because by her complaint the defendant was placed on notice
of her claim of negligence. Finally, if any limitations are to be placed on
the discovery, these limitations should be partial rather than outright
denials.
The judge could begin by allowing discovery of the information
regarding the last and next time the floor was cleaned and not allowing
identification of the materials used. Once Ms. Grier receives that
information and determines that the floor was cleaned within one-half
hour of the time of her fall, she could then ask the court to find that there
is good cause to require disclosure of the materials used. Of course, if
the information regarding the cleaning of the floor did not reveal that the
floor was cleaned in such close proximity to the time of Ms. Grier's fall,
then the court would not have to allow further discovery. By adhering
to these guidelines, the court upholds the purposes of discovery while at
the same time ensuring that a plaintiff who has followed the rules of
pleading practice and gives notice of her claim obtains the discovery
needed to prove her claim under the new scope of discovery standard.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) merely refocuses the parties and
realigns their responsibilities. The concern that it may require parties,
especially plaintiffs, to file more fact-specific pleadings in order to obtain
necessary discovery is a fallacy. As revealed by Ms. Grier's hypothetical,
the new scope of discovery standard still allows the same discovery
allowed under the old scope standard, it just may require an additional
step in the process: court involvement. However, as revealed by the
hypothetical, if the courts follow the suggested guidelines, the same
types of information will ultimately have to be disclosed by the parties.
On the other hand, the amendment may not even have an effect
upon notice pleading. It is questionable whether true notice pleading in
fact actually occurs in practice. As such, the alleged effect of the
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) upon notice pleading may be merely an
academic, rather than a practical, concern. If this is true, the federal
courts will likely not experience an increase in discovery-related practice.
However, if true notice pleading does occur in all or certain areas of
pleading practice, then the federal judiciary's adherence to the flexibility
intended for the good cause standard, coupled with the guidelines
synthesized from the cases decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court
with respect to its similar scope of discovery standard, will ensure that
notice pleading is maintained in the federal procedural system despite
the new amendment to the scope of discovery standard.
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